

Research article

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Nikolai Berdyaev and Carl Jung On God's Need for Human Person

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ABSTRACT: The article deals with the possibility of developing religious thought and church teaching in the light of the influence of the human personality on the change in the image of God and on the capacity for the divine cognition. The generally accepted ideas of God's being, based on Greek thought and the sacred patristic heritage, do not allow God to need anything or anyone else, since this would imply His incompleteness and imperfection. The concepts by N. A. Berdyaev and C. G. Jung of personality presented in this article challenge this view and suggest that God has a need for man. At the same time, Berdyaev only designates the idea of God's "need" as a need for communion with man, while Jung, using the biblical story of Job, offers a detailed description of how man's response to Yahweh can change the image of God himself. In this regard, unconscious forms such as dreams, visions and epiphanies are more reliable accounts of the nature of God than theological constructions.

The first part of the study identifies the essential features of personality in Berdyaev's concept. It reveals the thesis that divine perfection manifests itself in God's aspiration for His otherness as well as in His creation of another person, understood as an existential centre with an inexhaustible potential to generate novelty. The second part discusses Jung's idea of individuation as the

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most important characteristic of personality — the event when an individual activates his consciousness and is ready to accept the mutability of God’s being and the consequent possibility of new revelations. It is suggested that although Jung’s approach is within the realm of psychoanalysis, it may also have implications for theology.

KEYWORDS: theology, anthropology, personality traits, existential centre, individuation, Berdyaev, Jung

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Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding!

I. Kant. What is Enlightenment?

To sail from safe shores towards an unknown and yet undiscovered continent from which no helping hands reach out.

N. Berdyaev. The Meaning of the Creative Act

Anyone who takes the sure road is as good as dead.

C. G. Jung. Memories, Dreams, Reflections

In this essay I will compare some of the crucial aspects of the notion of the human person as outlined by N. A. Berdyaev and C. G. Jung, focusing especially on the role personality plays in the transformation of God-image. The reasons to make a comparative study of Berdyaev and Jung are numerous¹. However, probably the most important one is the idea that they share about the “need” God feels for human beings.

However, while Berdyaev hardly goes beyond mentioning that the meaning of God’s “need” is that he longs to be enriched by humans, in his “Answer to Job” Jung offers a meticulous description of the transformation through which God-image passes depending on the human attitude towards Yahweh. For example, Yahweh’s encounter with Job,

1. The only monograph so far dedicated to a comparison of Berdyaev and Jung is Georg Nicolaus’: [Nicolaus].

according to Jung, corresponds to the moment of mid-life crisis in the development of the God concept [*Bishop*, 81].

But before we continue with our scrutiny, we would like to say a few words about Berdyaev's mode of thinking, which is also a methodological model applied in this essay. According to Paul Tillich, Berdyaev's mode of thought is the characteristic and most valuable contribution of the Eastern Church to the religious thinking of today [*Tillich*, 290 ff]. What is it that is so special about this mode of thought to incite Tillich's flattering assessment?

Tillich explains: "Berdyaev himself calls his type of thought 'theosophy' and means by this *a free further development of ecclesial doctrines* in the spirit of speculative metaphysics and mystical intuition" (emphasis mine. — R. K.) [*Tillich*, 290]. Tillich's emphasis is obviously on the "free further development of ecclesial doctrines". This further development demands the possibility of free thinking. Berdyaev's "free thinking", Tillich tells us, entails methods of speculative metaphysics and mystical intuition. This means that unlike representatives of the Neo-patristic synthesis — namely, John Zizioulas — Berdyaev never calls for a return to the Fathers and never sets patristic works as an indispensable criterion of truth. Zizioulas, on the other hand, believes that "theology, without the Church Fathers as guides, ceases to be Orthodox theology"². The very question "Neo-patristic synthesis or Post-patristic theology represents a false dilemma", since what is needed "is not to go beyond the Fathers but rather only to interpret them"³.

Zizioulas, however, seems to be ignoring a simple hermeneutical fact that there are as many interpretations as there are interpreters and as many criteria of truth as there are interpretations. No outward or "objective" fact will ever be *per se* able to satisfy our quest for the unwavering truth since it first needs to be interpreted⁴.

It follows that to "think freely" for Berdyaev means to "have courage to use your own understanding". The words we have just quoted belong to Immanuel Kant. In his famous essay "*An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?*" Kant argues that Enlightenment is "man's emergence from the self-incurred immaturity".

2. John (Zizioulas), metr. "The Timeliness and Timelessness of the Neopatristic Synthesis": unpublished paper from conference "Neo-Patristic Synthesis or Post-Patristic Theology: Can Orthodox Theology be Contextual?", June 2010, Volos.

3. Ibid.

4. In this sense, Zizioulas methodology belongs to the Platonic philosophy of the world or the object, and

not the Kantian philosophy of the ego or the subject. Philosophy of the object, according to Berdyaev, is a "naïve realism", which is the general outlook of the greater part of mankind. "Greek (Platonic) thought was directed to the object and it is German thought alone which has turned towards the subject" [*Berdyaev* 2009c, 5].

Immaturity is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without the guidance of another. Self-incurred is this inability if its cause lies not in the lack of understanding but rather in the resolution and the courage to use it without the guidance of another. Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding! Is thus the motto of enlightenment [Kant, 58].

It seems that the method of the Neo-patristic synthesis betrays vestiges of “the self-incurred immaturity”, i. e., of the lack of resolution and courage to use understanding without any external guidance. If it is true that we should not go “beyond the Fathers” but should only interpret them, it follows that our interpretation can never — and *must* never — discover any flaws in the patristic texts. Nonetheless, had the works of the Fathers been flawless we would have had a *consensus Patrum*. But, unanimity between the Fathers exists only on the doctrinal level and not on the level of theology. In other words, they agree, for example, that God is One in three hypostases, but their interpretation of hypostasis is not identical.

According to Kant, dogmas and formulas, or mechanical instruments for rational use (or rather misuse) of his natural abilities and gifts, are the ball and chain of man's permanent immaturity. Kant continues:

Whoever casts them off would still take but an uncertain leap over the smallest ditch, because he is not accustomed to such free movement. Hence There are only a few who have managed to free themselves from immaturity through the exercise of their own minds, and yet proceed confidently [Kant, 59].

Should an ecclesiastical synod, Kant asks, commit itself to a certain set of unalterable doctrines? In his view, this is quite impossible. He explains that a contract of this kind, “concluded for the purpose of closing off forever all further enlightenment of the human race, is utterly null and void even if it should be confirmed by the highest power...” [Kant, 61].

One age cannot bind itself, and thus conspire, to place the succeeding age in a situation in which it becomes impossible for it to broaden its knowledge (particularly such pressing knowledge), to cleanse itself of errors, and generally to progress in enlightenment. *That would be a crime against human nature, whose original destiny consists in this progress; and posterity would be fully justified to reject these resolutions as concluded in an unauthorized and outrageous manner* (emphasis mine. — R. K.) [Kant, 61].

For the enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom, reminds us Kant. Moreover, the freedom in question is the most harmless form of all freedom since what it entails is only the public use of one's reason in all matters. And, "the *public* use of reason must at all times be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among the men" [*Kant*, 59].

Kant stresses that it is impermissible to agree to a permanent religious constitution that no one might publicly question. In his view, this would abolish a phase in man's upward progress, making it detrimental for ensuing generations [*Kant*, 61].

As if unmistakably following the *sapere aude* precept of the Enlightenment, Berdyaev does not only see a few minor imperfections in the patristic teachings; he brazenly and explicitly warns against the restoration of the Christianity of the Fathers. In his view, the writings of the Fathers lack true anthropology.

In this lies a grave danger for our epoch, the danger of the restoration of the Christianity of the Fathers, which has no true anthropology. Such a restoration might play into the hand of the spirit of the Antichrist. When religious consciousness leaves an empty place, it is filled by the spirit of the Antichrist. Religious demeaning and oppression of man lead to a false over-estimation of himself that finally destroys him [*Berdyaev 2009d*, 93].

Following the method of free further development of doctrines, the Russian philosopher, while keeping some of the assets from the patristic period, introduces new traits. The common denominator of all these qualities is the indispensable role that the person plays in the life of God. However, Berdyaev never attempts to give a more detailed account of the human input to God's life. This is exactly why Jung is so important for our research because what he has to offer is precisely a minute description of all the phases in the transformation of God-image.

Berdyaev's Concept of Personality

As his initial step towards a description of God as an infinite personality, Berdyaev borrows Nicholas of Cusa's words that God is a *coincidentia oppositorum*. The qualities that are irreconcilable from a rationalistic point of view find themselves in God in perfect harmony. But perfection usually implies immobility. If something is perfect it follows that it does not need to struggle to attain more perfection. Such a striving would be suggestive of imperfection. The argument of the theological

and metaphysical doctrine of the absolute immobility of God seems to be reasonable. Yet Berdyaev rejects this as sheer rationalism. Precisely because of the divine perfection, in God absolute rest is inseparably interwoven with absolute motion. God's perfection does not entail immobility. God is spirit and life. If something is a living being or personality⁵, this according to Berdyaev means that it possesses the capacity for an infinite origination of newness.

As seen, Berdyaev argues that liberty is associated with what is infinite. Since infinity exists only in a personal form, i. e., as a concrete personality, we may conclude that liberty is always related to an infinite person. An infinite person is infinite and free because she is capable of a limitless generation of the unprecedented. Berdyaev describes freedom as the capacity to create out of nothing, that is, to create things that were formerly non-existent. Personality and freedom, life and spirit are inconceivable if the appearance of totally new realities is impossible.

Berdyaev believes that infinite personality cannot exist if we understand it as a windowless monad as was the case with Leibnitz. For Leibnitz monad is a simple substance, "it is closed, shut up, it has neither window nor doors", explains Berdyaev. Personality, on the other hand, is in a constant encounter with infinity. Berdyaev adds, "for personality, however, infinity opens out, it enters into infinity, and admits infinity into itself; in its self-revelation, it is directed towards an infinite content" [*Berdyaev 2009b*, 22].

Since personality is not a closed monad we can conclude that in Berdyaev's vision personality cannot exist in isolation⁶. It has to be 'directed towards an infinite content. Infinite content for a personality could only be other infinite personalities. Once we break with an image of God as a lifeless substance and see him as a limitless spirit and life, movement and action, it follows that the genuine God ought to be personality. And since personality needs an infinite content, that is, needs another infinite personality, we have to conclude that genuine divine freedom is plausible only if God is more than one person⁷. This is why Berdyaev addresses

5. I argue that Berdyaev uses these two terms as synonyms.

6. Zizioulas entertains a similar understanding of personality as a relational being. "The person cannot exist in isolation. God is not alone; he is communion" [*Zizioulas 2006*, 166]. However, Zizioulas's concept of the identity of divine persons does not entail infinity. Without infinite divine personalities, it is not possible to conceive of divine freedom like Berdyaev's.

7. Jürgen Moltmann has grasped this point of Berdyaev's thought. Moltmann writes: "Anyone who denies movement in the divine nature also denies the divine Trinity. And to deny this is really to deny the whole Christian faith. For according to Berdyaev, the secret of Christianity is the perception of God's triune nature, the perception of the movement in the divine nature which that implies, and the perception of the history of God's passion which springs from this. Christian faith is the experience of the boundless freedom of which this is the source" [*Moltmann*, 45].

a very severe critique of any form of monotheism that does not envisage God as the Trinity. Berdyaev even sees such monotheism as a form of idolatry. He argues, “a naturalist attitude towards God, conceived of as a metaphysical transcendent Being, an immobile Substance, represents the latest form of idolatry in the history of the human spirit. Monotheism can indeed be a form of idolatry” [*Berdyaev FS*, 23].

From his categorical rejection of non-Trinitarian monotheism, it is obvious that Berdyaev did not think that the oneness of God is incompatible with the three divine Hypostases. He firmly believed that in the revelations of spiritual life the Three form perfect unity without losing their particularity. In the life of the spirit, there is no room for antithesis between unity and multiplicity.

Unity is not opposed to multiplicity as to some exterior reality, for it penetrates the latter and creates its life while at the same time leaving it as multiplicity. “I am in my Father, ye are in me, and I in you”. <...> It is on this victory over the outside-ness and extrinsicity⁸ [*vnepolozhnost*] of the one and the many that spiritual life is based [*Berdyaev 2009a*, 17].

The Trinitarian nature of God, claims Berdyaev, is only unacceptable for rational thought⁹. Moreover, rational thought has a natural inclination towards monism: “Reason, without the illumination of faith, tends naturally towards monism or dualism, and the mythological character of the Christian Trinity is an offence to the reason, which is too ready to see in it a form of polytheism” [*Berdyaev 2009a*, 73].

Like Gregory Palamas¹⁰, Berdyaev talks about the inner life of the Trinity being principally characterized by love and longing between the divine persons¹¹. The internal relationships between the hypostases of the Trinity are dynamic and are revealed as concrete life [*Berdyaev 2009a*, 192]¹². A Monotheistic God could only love Himself.

8. We could also translate this term as “exteriority” or “outsideness”.

9. “Berdyaev asserts that the Trinitarian doctrine cannot be derived from the law of identity, ‘the main law of reason’. The law of identity expresses the fallen and limited order of nature as opposed to the order of freedom. The doctrine of the Trinity, on the other hand, implies belief in the realm of infinite existence. Such existence is unconstrained by the law of identity. The Trinitarian doctrine ‘is sanctioned not by the law of logic, but by the law of logos’, and can be grasped only by intuitive rather than by discursive thinking” [*Aksionov-Meerson*, 107].

10. See chapter Two of the “*Freedom and the Spirit*”.

11. Sergius Bulgakov gives credit to Berdyaev for emphasizing the humanity of God in biblical representation. “To reduce all this [God’s emotions] to anthropomorphism is to close one’s eyes to Divine reality and to replace the fiery words of Holy Scripture with the scholasticism of seminarians” [*Bulgakov*, 133].

12. Berdyaev was well aware, in his own words, that “when we approach this mystery we find ourselves on a razor edge and it is very easy to fall from it in either direction; a fall which the Church calls heresy” [*Berdyaev FS*, 192]. However, he believed that all forms of heresies are indications of a rationalistic approach to

But the flow of limitless life is possible only between divine persons that are equal in dignity. The Father begets the Son out of God's longing for intra-divine eros, and "it is the Son, born from all eternity, equal in dignity to the Father, Who responds to the divine aspiration of the loving subject and the loved object" [*Berdyaeu* 2009a, 198].

Berdyaeu grounds his vision of the unity in God, not on the unity of the divine nature or the monarchy of the Father. The oneness in God is a result of personal intra-Trinitarian eros and longing in which none of the Hypostases is in subordination.

The antithesis between the one and the many... has its origin in space, time, and matter, which are simply the result of the Fall and the separation from God. Spiritual life is lived outside time, space, and matter... In spiritual life and experience, there is given to me the interior unity of my destiny as well as that of the world, and God Himself [*Berdyaeu* 2009a, 18]¹³.

For Berdyaeu, personality is a dynamic living being that implies the capacity for the infinite generation of newness. Freedom is bound up with the infinite potential of the spirit, meaning that freedom is identified with an infinite personality. Personality, on the other hand, is infinite insofar as it produces total newness. From this point of view, we have a better comprehension of Berdyaeu's description of freedom as the power to create out of nothing.

Berdyaeu's entire vision of human personality and human freedom, as well as his vision of God, rests upon the human capacity to create radical excess in being. This is why most of Berdyaeu's critics who were not comfortable with his concept of the "external" *Ungrund*, had to reject Berdyaeu's teaching of the human person¹⁴. At this point, we need to establish the main tenets of Berdyaeu's vision of human personality.

the divine mysteries, of thinking that does not allow for antinomy in thinking about God. It is reason without illumination that produces heresies, concurrently condemning supra-rational thinking as heretical. "Heretical doctrines are always rationalizations of spiritual experience because they regard as the whole truth what is only partially true. The mystics of Christianity do not make this mistake. They put forward the most daring ideas which alarm the minds of average people and appear sometimes even more extravagant

and more contrary to our accustomed faith than the teaching of heretics" [*Berdyaeu* FS, 193].

13. Although in this paragraph Berdyaeu talks on an anthropological level, it is possible by way of analogy to apply his view in the framework of the inner life of God.

14. See: [*Lubardić*, 78–83]. Lubardić argues that Berdyaeu's anthropology betrays "neo-humanistic tendencies" [*Lubardić*, 78]. Also: [*Seaver*, 15; *Vallon*, 197].

The Main Principles of Berdyaev's Concept of Personality

Firstly, 1) we can reach the meaning of the creation of the human only if we grasp the inner life of the Divine Being.

Traditional affirmative theology has been closely confined within rational concepts and that is why it has been unable to grasp the *inner life of the Divine Being, solely in which the creation of the world and man* (that is to say, the attitude of God towards His other self) *can be understood* (emphasis mine. — R. K.) [Berdyaev 2009a, 190].

Berdyaev is saying here that there is a strong parallel between the reasons why God is the Trinity — why the Father begets the Son and spires the Spirit — and the creation of the human. Although the human person is created, God needs her almost in the same way as the Father needs the other two Hypostases¹⁵. The problem is that at this point Berdyaev's thought is imprecise. It is not the inner life of the Trinity that enlightens our understanding of the creation but, as we shall see, the creation of the person explains the relations between the divine Hypostases. Berdyaev never elucidates explicitly why the Father needs the Son. To say, as Berdyaev does, that the Father longs for the Son because of His love for His Son is a tautology. As I have argued drawing from Rowan Williams, the source of the intra-trinitarian *eros* lies in the irreducible character of the personal otherness of the Trinity. To abolish the “eternal difference” between the persons would be, as Williams observes, to abolish the love itself [Williams, 117].

This first principle of human personality leads secondly to

2) Since God needs his creature, the traditional concept of creation has to be rejected¹⁶. Berdyaev claims, “rationalistic and exoteric religious thought is obliged to maintain the cruel idea that God created

15. Berdyaev is aware that due to the limitations of human language it is difficult to express the exact character of God's “need” for man. He writes, “in the depths of spiritual experience there is revealed not only man's need of God but also God's need of man. But clearly, the word ‘need’ here is an inexact expression, as indeed are all human terms when applied to God” [Berdyaev FS, 210].

16. If we again take Maximus the Confessor as an example of Patristic teaching, we find that, despite his teaching on the human as microcosm and mediator, he does not understand the creation of the person as

‘necessary’ for God, or as a part of the interior life of the Divine. Maximus emphasizes that God is immovable and that movement pertains only to creatures. The goal of the creation is that creatures find rest in God's immobility. Although this rest is conceived as “perpetual striving” (ἐπέκτασις), it is clear that only creatures strive towards God whereas God Himself is utterly immovable vis-à-vis His creation. (See: Maximus the Confessor. “Quaestiones ad Thalassium. 60”, in CCSG 22, pp. 73–81; “Ambiguorum. 7”, in PG 91, col. 1069A–1077B.)

the world capriciously, without necessity, and entirely unmoved from within” [Berdyaeu 2009a, 190].

If the creation was not necessary for God, not only the world and the person, but the entire creation is without significance and is going to perish, contends Berdyaeu¹⁷. To secure a genuine basis for human liberty, argues Berdyaeu, we need to see the mystery of the creation ‘as the interior life of the Divine. What Berdyaeu tries to say here is that we can grasp what human freedom is only if we understand that we are intrinsically connected with the life of the Trinity¹⁸. That is, it seems that Berdyaeu argues that it is impossible to avoid monophysitism if God creates the human without ‘necessity’ for him. This mystery, contends Berdyaeu, “is the need which God feels for His other self, of one who loves and is beloved, which is realizable within the Trinity in Unity, which exists both above, and below, in heaven, and on earth” [Berdyaeu 2009a, 191].

Berdyaeu claims that the theological doctrine in which God created the human for His glory is not only degrading to us but degrading to God as well. Berdyaeu notices a striking fact that any doctrine that debases the creature also debases God [Berdyaeu 2009b, 39]. He is aware that it is against the generally accepted Christian view of God to claim that God is in need, or that He experiences longing or desire¹⁹. According to the traditional view, if God longs for something or some-

17. It is clear that for Berdyaeu we cannot ground human freedom solely on the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*, that is, on the doctrine according to which the creation of the world was not an act of necessity. If God creates freely, His creation, according to Patristic teaching, also possesses freedom and is even “equal of honour” (ὀμότιμος) [Patristic lexicon, 961].

18. This is one of Berdyaeu’s most fundamental principles, without which his concept of Godmanhood remains incomprehensible, and I shall return to it later.

19. For a different view of the patristic position about divine passibility and impassibility, see: [Gavrilyuk]. In his book, Gavrilyuk argues that the “picture of an essentially impassibilist account of God in patristic theolog is incorrect”. According to patristic teaching, observes Gavrilyuk, God deliberately accepted all the consequences of his incarnation, including suffering and death [Gavrilyuk, 20]. However, he also points out that “in the contemporary theological climate impassibility is so universally presented in an unfavourable light that it is quite often ignored that the notion of unrestricted divine passibility is also fraught with many difficulties”. He emphasizes that not all human emotions may be ascribed to God [Gavrilyuk, 5–6].

As an illustration of a passibility that is not necessarily incompatible with God, I shall quote a passage from Origen: “He [the Saviour] came down to earth in pity for the race of men. By our affections He was affected, before He was affected by the sufferings of the cross and condescended to take our flesh upon him. Had he not been affected, He would not have entered into association with the life of men. First He is affected; then He comes down and is seen. What is that affection whereby on our account He is affected? *It is the affection of love*. The Father Himself, too, the God of the Universe long-suffering, and of great compassion, full of pity, is not He in a manner liable to affection? Are you unaware that, when He orders the affairs of men, He is subject to the affections of humanity? The Lord thy God bear with thy ways as if a man should bear with his own son. God then bears with our ways, just as the Son of God bears with our affectations. *The Father is not impassible, without affectations*. If we pray to Him, He feels pity and sympathy. He experiences an affection of love. He concerns himself with things in which, by the majesty of His nature, He can have no concern, and for our sakes, He bears the affections of men” (In Ezech. VI.6) [Origen, 15–16].

one, this implies two things: first, that God's being is mutable and mobile. Second, God is imperfect. Moreover, this position, which was mainly influenced by Parmenides and the philosophic school of Elis [Berdyaev 2009a, 192], claims that the Absolute, as a perfect being is immobile and self-sufficient²⁰. Berdyaev believes that this understanding is a product of objectification, an invention of our rational consciousness that thinks on a natural level. Only in the natural world does rest exclude motion, and this is so because natural reasoning is confined to the laws of Aristotelian logic. Nevertheless, clarifies Berdyaev, God is *coincidentia oppositorum*, and in God absolute rest is inseparable from absolute motion.

Berdyaev also argues that we should break with our concept of perfection as an abstract, immobile, and static substance²¹. God is not substance, God is life, contends Berdyaev. God's longing for His other, and His creation of the other, is not a manifestation of divine insufficiency, but precisely a sign of the superabundance of His plenitude and perfection [Berdyaev 2009a, 191].

Now we need to ask, what is the actual attribute of God's perfection? If we understand what divine perfection is this will explain that divine longing does not necessarily entail God's imperfection. The question is related to the point previously made, i. e., that God's need for, and creation of, the human does not involve insufficiency. Divine yearning for his other, it appears, is not a deficiency precisely due to the character of the divine act of creation. God's genuine power and perfection are hidden in the features of His creative act. God's creative act, on the other hand, justifies God's longing for His other, because this action brings into being a very special kind of creature, i.e., the human personality. Due to the very character of the human personality, God's longing for his created other is not a sign of insufficiency, but quite contrary, it is a testimony of His perfection and His freedom. In other words, God's perfection and freedom are in His power to create the human personality.

20. Zizioulas sees God's self-sufficiency as a form of "closed ontology". On this point Zizioulas quotes E. L. Mascall who refers to the classical Greek thought, Platonic and Aristotelian alike, as holders of a doctrine of "closed" natures. Mascall observes that for all Greeks "everything had a nicely rounded off nature which contained implicitly everything that the being could ever become... What Greek thought could not have tolerated... would have been the idea that a being could become more perfect in its kind by acquiring some characteristic which was not implicit in its nature before" [Mascall, 246; Zizioulas 1997, 70,

n. 11]. According to a popular reading of Parmenides besides being complete and unchangeable, the One is also eternal and timeless (see: [Sanders, 62]).

21. While Greek religion spoke of the ultimate reality as personal, philosophy endeavoured to purify the concept of deity from anthropomorphism. For this purpose, philosophy used the methods of natural theology, deducing the concept of deity from the notion of perfection, since nothing less than perfection is appropriate for God (the method of *theoprepes*) [Sanders, 61].

The question about divine perfection is important for us because it sheds light on Berdyaev's concept of the human person. I shall seek to elucidate what divine perfection is by analyzing God's works. The reason for this is quite simple. Probably the best way to evaluate any personality is by looking into that personality's works²². God's perfection should become apparent if we examine his best work. What is God's best creative achievement? Berdyaev's answer is: "The idea of man is the greatest divine idea" [*Berdyaev 1950, 209*]²³. In stating this, we can establish the third principle of human personality according to Berdyaev:

3) human personality is God's most valuable piece of work. We could even assume that God would have created even more accomplished beings had this been, so to say, "necessary", and not only "necessary", but also "possible"²⁴. I shall explain shortly how this daring idea can be justified. According to Berdyaev, the human is the best of God's realizations. Berdyaev also adds that "the primordial idea in man is the idea of God, which is the theme of humanity, just as man is the theme of God" [*Berdyaev 2009a, 197*].

From these two statements, it follows that out of the entire creation only the human is created in the divine image and likeness. This being so, we have to accept Berdyaev's contention that the human is the greatest divine idea since it would be simply impossible to conceive of anything "greater" than the being created in God's image. Was it "possible" for God to create something more perfect than His image?

22. According to Berdyaev, personality presupposes an immutable but ever-developing identity. Although a personality is supposed to constantly develop and create itself, each of that personality's manifestations bears a unique and personal seal. "The form of personality is integral, it is present as a whole in all the acts of personality, personality has a unique and unrepeatable form" [*Berdyaev 2009b, 23*].

23. Berdyaev expresses the same idea in "*Freedom and the Spirit*", but due to his poetic and non-systematic way of writing, his outline is less clear. That is, instead of saying that the idea of man is the greatest divine idea, Berdyaev uses the adjective "primordial" [osnovnaya]: "The primordial divine idea is the idea of man" [*Berdyaev FS, 234*].

24. The standard Patristic view on this issue, with some dissenting voices, is that human nature, due to its dual, bodily and spiritual nature, occupies a lower level than angelic nature. For Greek authors who contend man's superiority to the angels, see, among others: *Macar. Aeg. Hom. XV. 22, 43*; *Anast. Quaest. 78. 708A-B*; *Gregor. Capit.*

63. 1165C-D, cited in [*Mantzaridis, 19*]. However, in *Gregor. Capit. 27. 1140A* Palamas argues about the superiority of angels (see: Kallistos (Ware) [*Ware, 206*]). However, it is because of its mixed character that human nature can play the role of the microcosm, that is, to unite the spiritual and the bodily levels, thus helping the material world to be spiritualized. Hence we could claim that human nature, as Ware observed, "if not at the summit of the created order, is certainly at the centre". Ware adds, "An angel does not reflect and hold together in his person the entire creation, and so cannot serve as a microcosm. This is a role fulfilled only by a human. Our human nature, precisely because it is mixed, is more complete than the angelic, and by its greater complexity, it also possesses richer potentialities" [*Ware, 200*]. However, probably the only criterion upon which one can assert or deny the superiority of angels would be the capacity of angels to create radical newness. If the human is the only creature endowed with such a capacity, this, despite his double nature, places him above the angels.

Furthermore, the dignity of the human, the significance of *imago Dei*, and consequently the perfection and power of God, are in the human capacity to create the idea of God. This contention needs elucidation. Berdyaev certainly did not mean to say that one creates God in an anthropomorphic way. Berdyaev claims, I argue, that one is capable of producing an “idea” about God that does not diminish divine superabundant perfection, that is, that does not abolish divine transcendence. To ‘create an idea’ about God means moreover that one can cognize God, i. e., that for us God is both transcendent and immanent. This is possible only on the condition that human cognitive faculties are illuminated and that they, in a paradoxical manner, transcend themselves. Berdyaev writes:

Cognizance of God involves a passage through the revolution of consciousness, through spiritual enlightenment that changes the very nature of human reason. The enlightened and illuminated reason is a reason of a different kind, belonging neither to this world nor to this age. God is immanent in the reason when it is enlightened, illuminated, and spiritually integrated [*Berdyaev 2009a*, 73].

If we are capable of cognizing God, it follows that Berdyaev does not see *imago Dei* simply as a metaphorical term. The human being is indeed created and yet endowed with the capacity to transcend its createdness. Hence the human is potentially God by grace, that is, designed both as a microcosm and microtheos. If God creates His other who is God by grace, we cannot say that God’s longing for His other is a sign of imperfection.

In summary: in seeking to define human freedom, we have looked into divine freedom, i. e., into its archetype without which human liberty is inconceivable. Freedom, holds Berdyaev, is related to infinity and infinite potentialities of spirit²⁵. Infinity exists only in personal form, thus freedom is connected to an infinite personality. Personality, on the other hand, is infinite insofar as it can create infinitely radical newness. Thus Berdyaev defines freedom as the power to create radical ever-newness. In God’s case, radical newness *par excellence* is human personality. What are the essential traits of the human personality based on which we see ourselves as microcosms and microtheos? Berdyaev writes, “created beings do not create personality — perso-

25. “The category of infinity is, for Berdyaev, a symbol of the mystery of existence that refuses to be locked into any closed and finite form, however

perfect. The Böhmean symbol of the *Ungrund*, which is the eternal freedom itself, is a symbol of that infinity that transcends all finite forms...” [*Nicolaus*, 115].

nality is created only by God” [Berdyaeu 2009d, 142], which leads us to establish the fourth principle of human personality according to Berdyaeu:

4) only God creates personality. In other words, personality is such a mysterious and powerful mode of being that only God can create it. Why is personality such a unique and powerful being? Although human personality cannot create another personality, it has the capacity, argues Berdyaeu, to generate hitherto non-existent values, a hitherto non-existent upsurge into truth, goodness and beauty. Human personality can create the super-worldly pleroma or fullness and completeness of being [Berdyaeu 2009d, 143]. Thus only God can create a being that is an existential centre with an inexhaustible and limitless capacity to engender newness. Personality is a living creature that at the bottom of its identity possesses a boundless source of ever-new life.

Moreover, I claim that Berdyaeu’s fifth principle of human personality is that:

5) personality implies identity. Although Berdyaeu does not use the term “identity” itself it is apparent that his concept of personality implies it. He writes, for instance, about the “unchanging” in personality, about the “unity” of persona, “personality is the unchanging in change, unity in the manifold” [Berdyaeu 2009b, 22]. Berdyaeu understands that personality cannot be conceived solely as that which is unchanging or exclusively as that which is changing. However, it is exactly the combination of the two that accounts for the dynamic character of personality.

It strikes us unpleasantly, alike if there is the unchanging in man and not change, and if there is change and not the unchanging; if there is unity and not the manifold, or the manifold and not unity. Both in one case and the other the essential qualitiveness of personality is disclosed [Berdyaeu 2009b, 22].

In contrast to Zizioulas, who claims that personality is *schesis* — moreover, that personality is created by *schesis*²⁶ — Berdyaeu claims that there must be an identity before a relationship; otherwise, there would be no one to create a relationship²⁷.

26. See: [Zizioulas 2006, 60–61].

27. Not only Zizioulas, but also the theology of open theism fails to address the issue of identity, both in the divine and the human context. For example, in “The Openness of God” [Sanders], already cited in this chapter, the concept of identity is absent.

Personality must construct itself, enrich itself, fill itself with universal content... But for this, it must already exist. There must originally exist that subject which is called upon to construct itself. Personality is at the beginning of the road and it is only at the end of the road. <...> Personality has a unique, unrepeatable form, *Gestalt* [Berdyaeu 2009b, 23].

By creating human personality, God creates an identity that is different from the identities of the divine Hypostases. I argue that the true character of the divine creation out of nothing is observed in the first place in God's power to engender a radically new identity. God's supreme creation out of nothing is the creation of human personality and identity. The miracle of God's creative act is that He creates living beings with the following features:

a) although created and dependent upon God, at the same time they are also able to act as autonomous beings, that is, as free and autopoietic (self-making) beings. Berdyaeu explains, "personality determines itself from within... and only determination from within and arising out of freedom, is personality" [Berdyaeu 2009b, 26]. Although human personality is created, it possesses the capacity for autonomous self-determination;

b) despite their created nature, each personality has a unique identity, an identity whose uniqueness can never be eradicated. Berdyaeu stresses that "personality is indestructible" [Berdyaeu 2009b, 23]²⁸. Yet, this does not imply that personality is coeternal with God as if God was not its Creator. Personality can be coeternal with God and still be God's creation because God conceived it out of time. Realized personality always transcends time;

c) identity is infinite; it could serve as a source of limitless growth and development. "For personality, however, infinity opens out, it enters into infinity, and admits infinity into itself", writes Berdyaeu [Berdyaeu 2009b, 22].

If we apply to God the difference between negative and positive freedom, we shall observe that God is not free merely because He is not determined by any external limitation — which would only be

28. This is in stark contrast with Zizioulas who in my opinion confuses the terms "identity" and "person". Zizioulas concludes that identity can cease to exist: "When you are treated as nature, as a thing, you die as a particular identity. And if your soul is immortal, what is the use? You will exist, but without a personal identity..." [Zizioulas 2006, 166]. Even if one is

treated as a thing it does not follow that one loses one's identity, for how can one lose something that was created and given to him as one's eternal identity? When one is treated as a thing or treats others in the same manner, one's identity is used in a wrong way and is not fulfilled as a personality.

negative freedom — such as pre-existing matter, space or ideas. God is free because He can create the miracle of human personality and identity — and that is positive freedom — which, although created, is also autonomous and endowed with the power to enrich God's life²⁹.

Human identity, despite its createdness, is endowed with autonomy, indestructible uniqueness, and infinity. I argue therefore that according to Berdyaev, God's freedom is in His capacity to create a microtheos. From God's idea about humans, we could draw an asymmetrical analogy between divine and human freedom. If divine freedom is in God's power to create human personality as His "greatest idea", it follows that human freedom ought to be asymmetrically similar to the divine. Asymmetry in this case is due to our createdness. Due to our createdness, firstly a) one cannot create radically new things without a medium; secondly b) one cannot create another personality. Nevertheless, what one can create is still so fundamentally new that one's creation enriches divine life. This is what Berdyaev implies when he says that the person is a microtheos.

For Berdyaev, Godmanhood is a primordial religious phenomenon. As a consequence, in theologising, we should start neither from God nor from the creature, but from the God-Man. Thus, the same principle should be applicable in the case of time and eternity. In order to reach the truth about the relation between time and eternity we need to start thinking from theanthropic time-eternity or what Berdyaev designates as meta-history [*Berdyaev 2009c*, 211]³⁰. Without such a concept of time, the hypostatic union of the divine nature and the human nature, as well as the idea of Godmanhood is unsustainable³¹. If Christ was walking amongst us as a human without ceasing to be God, then He must have been living in a theanthropic time-eternity or a meta-history. If Christ has ascended into the Father's bosom both as God and as the perfect Human, then time in the form of theanthropic time-eternity has its place in the Trinity. Since we are created in the divine image and as such are able to participate in the divine life, the creation of the human personality must have taken place in meta-history or theanthropic time-eternity, which are synonyms for the tradi-

29. By "God", here I mean God in his personal form.

30. Berdyaev distinguishes three forms of time: cosmic, historical, and existential. Cosmic time is calculated by mathematics on the basis of movement around the sun; this time is circular. Historical time is divided by mathematics into decades, centuries, and millennia. Since no event in historical time is repeatable, this time is linear. Existential time depends upon our expe-

rience and cannot be calculated. It is symbolised by the point and the movement in depth. Existential time is akin to eternity [*Berdyaev 2009c*, 206–207].

31. "Human historical destiny within time is not closed, but open to the transcendent, which may at any point enter into time. Nowhere is this eruption more dramatic than in the incarnation of the God-Man" [*Nicolaus*, 118].

tional term eternity³². We have arrived at the sixth characteristic of human personality:

6) the human was created in the anthropic meta-history or “eternity”.

Although in patristic texts we find a description of the person as a *microtheos* I believe that Berdyaev goes further than the Fathers. This is related to his understanding of the person as the “absolute existential centre”, not only in her relation to the world but also in her relation to God [Berdyaev 2009b, 26]. That which is by the inner logic of its being capable of being the absolute existential centre cannot serve as a means for some higher purpose. Although according to Berdyaev, the existence of human personality is preconditioned by the existence of the divine Personality, it would be incorrect to claim that God is the person's end and the person is merely a means to that end. As Berdyaev says, “man as personality cannot be a means to God as Personality” [Berdyaev 2009b, 39]. Rather than being consummated in her relationship with God, a human personality stands vis-à-vis God as an inexhaustible and ever-new existential centre.

Human Personality as an Absolute Existential Centre

Berdyaev makes yet another assertion that is seemingly in contradiction with divine supremacy. He claims that the person is “an absolute existential centre”. He states:

God exists if man exists. When a man disappears, God will also disappear. <...> Angelus Silesius says, “I know that without me God could not endure for a moment. Were I brought to nought He would yield up the Ghost for lack (of me)” [Berdyaev 2009a, 194]³³.

Renowned contemporary Russian mystic Sophrony Sakharov observes that his death involves the death of everything that his consciousness encompasses, including the Creator Himself. Drawing from his experience Sakharov writes, “the fact that with his [person's] death the whole world, even God, dies is possible only if he, of himself, is in a certain sense the centre of all creation” [Sophrony (Sakharov), 12–13].

32. “But it is absolutely impossible to conceive either of the creation of the world within time or of the end of the world within time. In objectified time there is no beginning, nor is there any end, there is only an endless middle. The beginning and the end are in existential time” [Berdyaev 2009c, 207].

33. One of the meanings of the death of God is the multiplication of life. God's death implies the descending of the Son of God into the original void of freedom [Berdyaev 2009a, 135]. By descending into meonic freedom, the New Adam empowers and resurrects human nature without acting as nature's determining cause.

We could add that if with our death even God dies, human personality is not only the centre of all creation but stands as such also in her relation to God.

We have arrived at the next feature of human personality according to Berdyaev:

7) human personality is the “absolute existential centre” of all creation and also in its relation to God. Is this contention in contrast with God’s supreme power? Again, no. Whenever Berdyaev talks about the person as a radical existential centre, he always does so concerning God and not the Godhead. What Berdyaev argues is that, if we die, God also dies, but this does not involve Godhead. God became God only for the sake of the creation [*Nicolaus*, 125]. Yet,

In the primal void of the divine Nothingness [of Godhead], God and creation, God and man disappear, and even the very antithesis between them vanishes. “Non-existent being is beyond God and differentiation”. The distinction between the Creator and creation is not the deepest that exists, for it is eliminated in the divine Nothingness that is no longer God [*Berdyaev 2009a*, 194]³⁴.

As a summary of the seventh characteristic of human personality, we recall that the “birth” of God, since it takes place in eternity, is a synchronic process resulting from divine Nothingness and primaeval will. The theogonic process also involves cosmogonic and anthropogonic processes; the latter is in fact at the very heart of the theogonic process. Although created, in terms of the inexhaustiveness of her identity, the person becomes an equal dialogical partner with God. As such, the person stands before God as another existential centre over whose freedom God has no power. The creature experiences herself as an existential centre with whose death everything, including God, dies³⁵.

These seven features of human personality are not everything that Berdyaev has to say about the question of human freedom. These seven characteristics are the seven layers of personality intertwined in mutual interaction. They make possible the full realization of human freedom. Nonetheless, one actualizes the completeness of one’s freedom only when one ‘activates’ the final trait of his personality. Berdyaev writes that due to the created identity’s infinity, the person is capa-

34. Using Whitehead’s terminology, this would mean that in the divine Nothingness the antithesis between God’s conceptual nature and derivative nature disappears.

35. Every man is potentially ομφαλός or umbilical of the world [*Siewers*, 43].

ble of limitless growth. Limitless growth is thus another key feature of human personality according to Berdyaev:

8) "Man is a being who surmounts and transcends himself. The realization of personality in man is this continuous transcending of self" [*Berdyaev 2009b*, 29].

The eighth attribute is closely linked to Berdyaev's definition of freedom as the power to create radical newness. If we agree with this understanding of freedom, it follows that the human active — and mutually enriching — interaction with God is the crown of our freedom. This is why for Berdyaev the highest form of freedom is the freedom of the eighth day of creation: "God expects from man the highest freedom, the freedom of the eighth day of creation..." [*Berdyaev 2009d*, 158].

Conclusion

For Berdyaev the only genuine theodicy is contingent upon anthropodicy. The true 'defence' of the human is the apology of human freedom. And one is free only if one can enrich the divine life. Thus Berdyaev defines freedom as the power to create radical newness.

In searching for the foundation of human freedom, Berdyaev borrows the concept of the *Ungrund* from the German mystic Jacob Böhme. However, unlike Böhme, Berdyaev places the *Ungrund* 'outside' of God. The *Ungrund* is positioned 'outside' of God but this is because it is regarded as God's nature. Since this kind of freedom is not controlled by God Berdyaev calls it uncreated or meonic freedom. The existence of uncreated freedom is the first precondition of genuine human freedom and personality.

Based on meonic freedom Berdyaev builds his theory of human personality. Despite Berdyaev's unsystematic presentation of the topic, the eight essential characteristics of human personality can be derived. Each of the eight features provides a certain quality crucial for the fulfilment of human freedom. The main features are:

- 1) there is a parallel between the origination of the Son and the Spirit and the creation of human personality. Theogony implies anthropogony;
- 2) God is in "need" of man. The conventional concept of Creation has to be rejected;
- 3) human personality is God's most valuable creation, more valuable even than that of the angels;

4) although the person can create radical novum, only God can create personality;

5) personality is not simply a relationship but implies identity. Identity is infinite. Without an identity, there would be no-one to create a relationship;

6) personality was not created in what is conventionally called time but in meta-history or theandric time-eternity;

7) personality is the supreme existential centre not only vis-à-vis creation but also concerning God;

8) personality is the continuous transcending of oneself according to the uniqueness of one's identity; personality ought to be unique and not comply with rules. God wants human beings to participate in the continuous creation of the world. Each personality is capable of bringing forth radical uniqueness and thus bringing newness to the divine life. This is the task that God expects from each human being.

C. G. Jung and the Notion of Human Personality

Unlike the first part of the essay, the second one will not try to give an extensive analysis of Jung's concept of the person (which, just like Berdyaev's, is rather complex). Instead, it will focus on what we believe is, in Jung's view, the most important quality of human personality. Berdyaev talks about this feature when he argues that the person is a part of the inner life of the Divine Being [Berdyaev 2009a, 190]. In other words, the life of God is ontologically united with the life of the human being³⁶.

Jung's book "*Answer to Job*" [Jung 2002] represents probably the clearest example of this conclusion. Unlike Berdyaev, however, Jung is keen not only to discern a person's exact capacity that makes it valuable for God but also to show in what way is God precisely being transformed depending on the person's reactions. One could argue that in this respect if compared to Jung, Berdyaev's thought remains somewhat abstract. Berdyaev certainly believed that there is a strong interdependence between God and human beings and that, moreover, God expects humans to continue the creation of the world. However, unlike Jung, when talking about God he never uses a term similar to "transformation"³⁷ neither he speaks about divine "individuation" as a

36. It should be stressed right from the start that Jung never attempts in making an intrusion into the sphere of metaphysics. As a psychologist, what he has in mind when speaking about "God" is, in fact, the

archetype of God or "God-image". See for example: [Stein, 103].

37. See, for example: [Edinger 1996, 81].

result of human behaviour³⁸. Thus, firstly, we shall focus on the most important asset of the human person, an asset that makes the person so precious to God. Secondly, we shall follow the actual act of God's transformation as it is provoked by Job's reactions.

Job and the superior knowledge of God

As we remember from the Old Testament story, Job is responding to God's "dark deeds" that, in quick succession, follow one another: robbery, murder, bodily injury with premeditation, and denial of a fair trial [Jung 2002; Bishop, 96]. Jung, therefore, wonders if there could be a deeper motive for Yahweh's conduct, "some secret resistance against Job" [Jung 2002; Bishop, 96].

It is just possible that something in this background will gradually begin to take shape as compensation for Job's undeserved suffering — something to which Yahweh, even if he had only a faint inkling of it, could hardly remain indifferent. Without Yahweh's knowledge and contrary to his intentions, the tormented though guiltless Job had secretly been lifted to a superior knowledge of God which God himself did not possess [Jung 2002].

We understand that Job has a "superior knowledge" of God, a knowledge that even God himself did not possess. The superior knowledge Jung has in mind is Job's capacity to see God's "back", i. e., a region in the divine being unapproachable for God. Consequently, if God cannot see his "back", this means that He is only partly aware of his nature. God, therefore, is mainly unconscious [Edinger 1996, 88]. "If the Creator were conscious of Himself, he would not need conscious creatures..." [Jung 1995, 371].

On the other hand, due to his moral behaviour — his undeserved suffering and long endurance — Job is privileged to see God's back. This is something that has never happened before in the history of the world. Both for Yahweh and Job it is crucial to be aware of God's dark side since this could give us a glimpse into the mystery of the origin of evil. "A mortal man is raised by his moral behaviour above the stars in heaven, from which position of the advantage he can behold the back of Yahweh, the abysmal world of 'shards'" [Jung 2002, 22].

38. "The life of Christ represents the process of individuation" [Edinger 1987, 15].

To behold Yahweh's back or the "abysmal world of 'shards'" means to see God's inner antinomy. In the later cabalistic philosophy, the "shards" are ten counterpoles to the ten *sefiroth*, which are the ten stages in the revelation of God's power. Shards represent the forces of evil and darkness, which have a separate and real existence [*Jung 2002*, 22, n. 8]. Yahweh is unjustly treating Job because humanity possesses the only thing that God does not: *consciousness*. God sees Himself through the eyes of human consciousness and this is the only way He can become acquainted with his "shadow" (to use the vocabulary of analytic psychology). The situation is not an easy one. God realizes what power is hidden in consciousness, but at the same time, he is trying to hide Job from himself. He is afraid of encountering his dark side and wishes to remain unconscious.

Privatio boni and the reality of evil

In Jung's understanding, evil is not an "absence of good". Evil is ontologically real, it belongs to God's unconscious and dark side. Jung explicitly rejects the doctrine of *privatio boni*. For him, "evil is as real as good, God is as dark as He/She is light, and the doctrine of evil as *privatio boni* is a convenient rationalisation of the ego-dominated Christian theological tradition" [*Stein*, 14–15].

While calling Goethe a "prophet" because he was aware of evil's universal power, he could not forgive him for having dismissed Mephistopheles "by a bit of jiggery-pokery". "For me, that was too theological, too frivolous and irresponsible, and I was deeply sorry that Goethe too had fallen for those cunning devices by which evil is rendered innocuous" [*Stein*, 34].

Jung does not want to fall for "cunning devices" of this kind. For him, the split in God's wholeness is unquestionable.

Nothing can take away from the concept of divine wholeness. But unbeknownst to all, a splitting of that wholeness ensued; there emerged a realm of light and a realm of darkness. This outcome, even before Christ appeared, was prefigured, as we may observe *inter alia* in the experience of Job or the widely disseminated Book of Enoch. In Christianity, too, this metaphysical split was perpetuated: Satan, who in the Old Testament still belonged to the intimate entourage of Yahweh, now formed the diametrical and eternal opposite of the divine world. He could not be uprooted [*Jung 1995*, 365].

Jung maintained that theology does not take the reality of the unconscious seriously enough and in this sense it is irreverent³⁹. One might add that theology behaves like Yahweh, who wishes to remain unconscious⁴⁰. Jung sees theological doctrines and rituals as the products of the “ego’s understanding”, which means they are rationalization of the original religious experiences. Original religious experiences, on the other hand, are an eruption of the unconscious. Jung believed that the raw data from the unconscious — dreams, visions, and synchronicities — are more likely to give a real picture of God than theology. This is also valid for the so-called “heretical” teachings, which are repressed thoughts representing the ego’s “shadow” and “personal unconscious”. “Absolute dogmas” only betray one-sidedness and defensiveness, acting as a barrier against the further eruption of the unconscious in the form of new revelations. It follows, oddly enough, that while connecting them to those aspects of God that are safe and controllable, *religions protect people from God* [Stein, 16]. Jung stresses that as long as one is harboured within a church or a set of doctrines one is spared the dangers of the unmediated religious experience. As Edinger argues, the development of the Church serves to protect the individual from the assault of a personal encounter with the *numinosum*. The Church does not expect — and seems to *a priori* reject — any new or individual revelations⁴¹. Jung explains:

The man who is not particularly bold... will... thank God that the Holy Spirit does not concern himself with us overmuch. One feels much safer under the shadow of the Church, which serves as a fortress to protect us against God and his Spirit.

39. See: [Stein, 16]. In this sense, theology seems to be representative of the contemporary cultural consciousness, which “has not yet absorbed into its general philosophy the idea of the unconscious and all that it means, even though modern man has been confronted with this idea for more than half a century. The assimilation of the fundamental insight that psychic life has two poles still remains a task for the future” [Jung 1995, 193].

40. Although Berdyaev does not embrace the doctrine of *privatio boni* in its classical interpretation, his view of the origin of evil differs from Jung’s. Berdyaev is trying to avoid both monism and dualism. Monism, explains Berdyaev, must end in the denial of evil, whereas dualism sees the origin of evil in another being existing side by side with the divine. A logical dualism has to admit the existence of an evil deity. According to dualistic theories, evil has an indepen-

dent and ontological source. In monism evil finally disappears whilst in dualism, it appears as a force apart from God. The origin of evil, Berdyaev stresses, is hidden in the unfathomable irrationality of freedom, in pure possibility. But when Berdyaev claims that evil “has no ontological ground” he is not advocating a theory similar to *privatio boni*. He is trying to say that evil originates in the *Ungrund* that in itself conceals the possibility both of evil and good [Berdyaev FS, 164–165].

41. See: [Edinger 1987, 128]. Karl Barth, the Swiss Calvinist theologian believed, similarly to Jung, that God is autonomous and free. “But for Barth, the Biblical revelation is final and complete. For Jung, ever the psychologist, much of the God-image is still unconscious and will be further revealed as time goes on” [Stein, 11].

It is very comforting to be assured by the Catholic Church that it “possesses” the Spirit...⁴²

When Jung, therefore, speaks about “consciousness” what he has in mind is not just a simple self-awareness. Consciousness is vital because it penetrates the darkness of the unconscious. It gives us an unfiltered and non-refined image of God’s antinomical nature with evil as a real, ontological threat. So to answer the question “whence evil” one would need to become aware that God is only — partially conscious⁴³.

This age-old question [whence evil] is not answered unless you assume the existence of a [supreme] being *who is in the main unconscious*. Such a model would explain *why God has created a man gifted with consciousness* and why He seeks His goal in him [*Letters*, v. 2, 435–436]⁴⁴.

This old question, Jung contends, has been given no answer by the Christian world, while Origen’s thoughtful suggestion of a possible redemption of the devil was rejected as a heresy. And today, “we are compelled to meet that question; but we stand empty-handed, bewildered, and perplexed...” [*Jung 1995*, 365]⁴⁵.

So firstly, consciousness is the power to behold the uncensored image of God; secondly, it is courage not to dismiss the reality of evil by some “jiggery-pokery” theological trick. Consciousness in this sense is directly related to the process of individuation.

Personality and individuation

As soon as one falls out of the limits of a conventional religious myth, one becomes a candidate for individuation [*Edinger 1987*, 15]. Individuation is a process that takes place when one becomes conscious — and ready to accept — the mutability of God’s being and the ensuing possibility of new revelations. God as a *coincidentia oppositoru* — a dialectical union of consciousness and unconscious — is unpredictable.

42. Quote from “Letter to Père Lachat” [*Jung 1976*]; Quoted in [*Edinger 1987*, 129].

43. Quoted in [*Edinger 1996*, 88]. Berdyaev might agree with Jung on this point as long as it is stated not that God is unconscious but that, in the form of the *Ungrund*, God has an unconscious part. In other

words, God is conscious that there is an unconscious part of his being.

44. Quoted in [*Edinger 1996*, 88].

45. For Jung’s extensive dealing with the problem of the origin of evil, see: [*Stein*, 79–110].

The Word happens to us: we suffer it, for we are victims of a profound uncertainty: with God as *complexio oppositorum*, all things are possible, in the fullest meaning of the phrase. Truth and delusion, good and evil, are equally possible [Jung 1995, 373].

Created in God's image, each one of us is similarly unpredictable⁴⁶. Being so, we can also expect new revelations and radical turnovers in our lives. This, furthermore, means that progress on the path of individuation requires abandoning collective dogmas and, following Kant's dictum, taking responsibility for one's unique path and understanding. Edinger contends that "betrayal" is a theme of individuation because it is related to the phenomenology of the opposites.

Loyalty and betrayal are a pair of opposites. Loyalty to the future may require betrayal of the past or vice versa. In a sense, Christ betrayed his collective Jewish heritage. *He was a heretic and therefore was punished as a traitor. This corresponds to the psychological fact that at a certain stage of development the individual may be obliged to betray collective loyalties to achieve individuation.* Later, the fruits of the "crime" may become a contribution to the collective (emphasis mine. — R. K.) [Edinger 1987, 82–83].

We cannot receive the Holy Spirit unless we have accepted our individual life as Christ accepted his, including his loyalty to the future and a betrayal of the past — his being a "heretic". Paul's life followed the same pattern. An unexpected experience transpired to him while he was blindly pursuing his way of being loyal to the past. Jung regarded Paul's path as a model for his own life.

As a young man, I concluded that you must obviously fulfil your destiny to get to the point where a *donum gratiae* might happen along. But I was far from certain, and always kept the possibility in mind that on this road I might end up in a black hole. I have remained true to this attitude all my life [Stein, 61].

Like Christ, we become the "sons of God" fated to experience the conflict of the divine opposites represented by the crucifixion⁴⁷. Receiving

46. "The *complexio oppositorum* of the God-image thus enters into man, and not as unity, but as conflict, the dark half of the image coming into opposition with the accepted view that God is 'Light'" [Jung 1995, 366].

47. Quoted in [Edinger 1987, 130]. *Imitatio Christi*, as Jung understands it, is not about the literal imita-

tion of Christ but the following of one's unique path. However, "historical trends led to the *imitatio Christi*, whereby the individual does not pursue his destined road to wholeness but attempts to imitate the way taken by Christ. <...> That Buddha should have become a model to be imitated was in itself a weakening of his idea, *Imitatio Christi* was a forerunner of the

the Holy Spirit, Jung emphasised multiple times, requires not only something more than obedience to the Church but rather something the opposite. Receiving the Holy Spirit for him is a highly revolutionary fact which cannot take place until the ambivalent nature of the Father (and the similar nature of the human being) is recognized [Edinger 1987, 130]. So when one walks the path of individuation, that is, when one lives one's own life, one must take mistakes into a bargain.

There is no guarantee — not for a single moment — that we will not fall into error or stumble into deadly peril. We may think there is a sure road. But that would be a road to death. Then nothing happens any longer — at any rate, not the right things. Anyone who takes the sure road is as good as dead [Jung 1995, 328].

Berdyayev would no doubt concur with Jung that “anyone who takes the sure road is as good as dead”, which is apparent from his encouraging the “virtue of living dangerously” [Berdyayev 2009d, 107]. He deems that one cannot see the Coming Christ — which is tantamount to receiving the gift of grace — unless one reveals in himself “the creative image of man”. This “creative image” obviously corresponds to Jung's process of individuation in which, by betraying the past, one searches for a still-non-existing future. It comes therefore as no surprise that one aspect of Berdyayev's thought is described as a “spirituality of individuation”, which underlines the uniqueness of each person's path. Creativity demands its form of asceticism and implies resistance to the subjection to collective norms: “It is concerned with finding what it is that I and only I can give to the world” [Nicolaus, 153].

Individuation is loyalty or, more precisely, “obedience” to one's uniqueness. Individuation is obedience to being disobedient. To be unique means not to be ontologically determined, i. e., to have the power of absolute self-determination. This is conceivable only if God is imagined not as the *prima causa* or the *Summum Bonum*, but as the *coincidentia oppositorum*, a union of the conscious and the unconscious with whom everything, truth and delusion, good and evil, are possible. To be brave essentially means to leave safe harbours of conven-

fateful stasis in the evolution of the Christian idea” [Jung 1995, 310]. To “imitate Christ” in fact means to accept that we are all “gods” capable of creating a new world (*Ibid*).

tional doctrines and to fearlessly derive all inevitable conclusions from the encounter with God's dark side. Berdyaev stresses:

The Coming Christ will never appear to him who by his free effort has not revealed within himself... the creative image of man. Only the courage of free creativity will bring man to the Coming Christ... And if great obedience is needed for redemption, for creativeness there is needed great courage. <...> In the spirit of obedience, we shall always see only Christ Crucified, only His aspect of Redeemer. We need the sacrifice of valour, the heroic courage to cast loose from all safe harbours. We must have the virtue of living dangerously. <...> In this fearful freedom lies all the god-like dignity of man, and his dread responsibility. The virtue of accepting a dangerous position, the virtue of daring to do, is the basic virtue of the creative epoch. Only he who possesses these virtues will vision the Coming Christ: only to him will the mighty and glorified Christ come [*Berdyaev 2009d, 108*].

“To sail away from safe shores towards an unknown and yet undiscovered continent from which no helping hands reach out” [*Berdyaev 2009d, 108*] ⁴⁸ is what God, indeed, requires from us. Berdyaev stresses that the Coming Christ will reveal His creative mystery only to the one who himself does daring acts of creativity [*Berdyaev 2009d, 108*]. There should be a transfer of the religious centre of gravity from the clerically-protective to the prophetically-creative. In his view, not only Christian priesthood, but Christian prophecy must become life. A prophetic attitude cannot be an experience of passive expectations but of creative striving. We cannot passively await the coming of Christ, we must go toward Him. “The desire and expectation that God Himself should create what man ought to create is impious and displeasing to God” [*Berdyaev 2009d, 335*].

Although Berdyaev underscores that the passive religious consciousness is displeasing to God, he is not being unequivocal as to whether human activity is needed — and if it is, in what measure — for the transformation of God. Possibly only due to Berdyaev's syntax, but we have an impression that God evolves independently of his creature. Despite human actions, it is God who is revealing His creative mystery. On the one hand, Berdyaev stresses human activity: the coming of Christ is connected with man's creative act; on the other hand, however, man is portrayed as a passive receptor of God's revelation:

48. “In his trial of human courage, God refuses to abide by traditions, no matter how sacred. In His omnipotence, He will see to it that nothing really evil comes of such tests of courage” [*Jung 1995, 57*].

Christ will never come in power and glory to men who are not creatively active — they will never see the second face of Christ: He will eternally turn toward them His crucified, tortured, and sacrificing face [Berdyaeu 2009d, 336].

Nonetheless, Jung’s description of the divine-human relationship is unambiguous: Job is the cause of God’s transformation and, in this sense, it follows that *human is superior to Yahweh*. That this is so is confirmed by Yahweh’s decision to incarnate as a human.

We remember that the only thing that is in humanity’s possession, which God does not have, is *consciousness*. It is due to his consciousness that Job stands morally higher than Yahweh and that the creature has surpassed the Creator.

The creator sees himself through the eyes of man’s consciousness and this is the reason why God had to become man, and why man is progressively gifted with the dangerous prerogative of the divine “mind” [Letters, v. 2, 435–436]⁴⁹.

Yahweh, therefore, chooses to raise himself above his earlier primitive level of consciousness. He does so by straightforwardly recognizing that man Job is morally higher than him and that therefore he has to catch up and become human himself [Jung 2002, 52]. As Jung explains, Yahweh must become a man because he has done a man wrong. “He, the guardian of justice knows that every wrong must be expiated... Because his creature has surpassed him he must regenerate himself” [Jung 2002, 52].

Contrary to the conventional interpretation of the Incarnation, it is Yahweh who needs to be atoned. By not yielding before the dreadful vision of Yahweh’s dark side and by firmly believing in his innocence, Job provoked the birth of consciousness in Yahweh and Yahweh’s decision to become human. Having become conscious, Yahweh realized that He has treated Job unfairly. Now, by incarnating He intends to regenerate Himself. Therefore, the raise and the differentiation of consciousness in Yahweh, for which He is indebted to Job, is the direct cause of the Incarnation.

Here we see a feature of the human person that does not figure in the work of Berdyaeu, the feature that nevertheless could be considered as the ninth trait of the person:

9) due to the power of consciousness — or the dangerous prerogative of the divine “mind” — *the person is superior to the Creator*. Jung

49. Quoted in [Edinger 1996, 88].

maintained that the human mind is a second world-creator [*Jung 1995, 371*]⁵⁰, to which we could add that the mind is also the God-creator⁵¹. As he puts it concisely, if the Creator were conscious of Himself, He would not need conscious creatures. Therefore, “the meaning of... the service which man can render to God, [is] that light may emerge from the darkness, that the Creator may become conscious of His creation, and man conscious of himself” [*Jung 1995, 371*].

Conclusion

As already stated, although it was depicted as a “spirituality of individuation”, Berdyaev’s theology remains equivocal when it comes to understanding the inner process of God’s transformation, the transformation which is related to His relationship with humans. Berdyaev’s wording leaves us with the impression that God evolves, but He does this independently from His creature. Finally, unlike Jung, Berdyaev never attempts to scrutinize some of the episodes either from the Old or the New Testament that would be an example of God’s individuation.

We may or may not agree with Jung’s conclusions. Berdyaev most probably would not feel comfortable, for example, with Jung’s claim that Yahweh was mainly unconscious, and he would certainly disagree with the ontological status that Jung ascribes to evil. There is no doubt that most o/Orthodox thinkers and believers would certainly reject some of Jung’s most important claims as sheer profanity. However, what cannot be denied is that the Swiss psychiatrist gives us

50. See also: “Now I knew... that man is indispensable for the completion of creation; that he is the second creator of the world, who alone has given to the world its objective existence, without which... it would have gone on in the most profound night of non-being down to its unknown end. Human consciousness created objective existence and meaning, and man found his indispensable place in the great process of being” [*Jung 1995, 285*]. Jung also uses the expression “the second cosmogony” (*Ibid*).

51. Jung contended that the main human task is to become conscious of the contents that press upwards from the unconscious, which he identifies with God’s abysmal world of shards (“When I do use such mythic language, I am aware that ‘mana’, ‘daimon’, and ‘God’ are synonyms for the unconscious” [*Jung 1995, 369*]). Human destiny — for which Job is an excellent example — is to create more and more consciousness.

By being courageous to behold Yahweh’s dark side, Job kindled a light in the divine darkness, forcing Yahweh to become aware of his ambivalent nature and eventually to incarnate as a human. “As far as we can discern, the sole purpose of human existence is to kindle a light in the darkness of mere being. It may even be assumed that *just as the unconscious affects us, the increase in our consciousness affects the unconscious*” (emphasis mine. — R. K.) [*Jung 1995, 358*]. Similarly to Job who dared to see God’s back, Jung was brave enough to allow into his consciousness the vision of God who, in a bizarre and terrifying way, destroyed the Basel cathedral (see: [*Jung 1995, 56*]). “Why did God befoul His cathedral? That, for me, was a terrible thought. But then came the dim understanding that God could be something terrible. I have experienced a dark and terrible secret” [*Jung 1995, 57*].

a meticulous description of God's evolution. Again, Jung is explicit that his approach is purely psychoanalytic and that his conclusions should not be taken as metaphysical statements. Could we, perhaps, if only for a very brief moment, be so bold as to entertain the possibility that Jung's loyalty to Kant's postulate about the unknowability of things-in-themselves is a likely contribution to theological methodology? Perhaps Jung believed that there is no unbridgeable chasm between the transcendent and immanent? What Jung is telling us is that we should start using psychological material — dreams, visions, and revelations — as precious evidence of what we can know about God. Jung warns us that theology does not take the unconscious seriously, to which we could add — *any longer*: theology does not take the unconscious seriously *any longer*. That it used to consider it seriously we know very well, for example, from the heavenly visits and dreams, revelations and visions of the Old Testament Patriarchs and prophets. However, while we consider their experiences as *revelations* — as trustworthy sources of theologizing — today we don't permit the possibility of new revelations. This is because we believe in a precarious idea of the *actus purus*, of God who is revealed in His totality and has no more messages for humankind. But, even if we agreed that God's capacity for new revelations is not exhausted, we would still hesitate to consider today's sages and prophets as reliable witnesses for theology. That the spirit of Enlightenment dwelt in Berdyaev is clear from his conviction that the philosophers of German idealism are today's Holy Fathers. There are no "objective" revelations, stresses Berdyaev, adding that every revelation is a revelation to a *particular* person.

We deem that the people of the olden times are better than us — although the reliability of their authority rested largely upon the attestations of something so evasive as miracles! — that they are the only ones infallible while we are everything opposite. But this unfortunate idea paralyzes our thinking because it radically denies its legitimacy, which inevitably includes also the validity of the conclusion that the ancients are more reliable than us. So, we are caught in a *circulus vitiosus*. Perhaps we'd better altogether abandon thinking, and let time show us the truth?

That would be a grave mistake. Because, there is no such thing as "time" concluding. In Berdyaev's words, this is a naïve realism. Finally, Berdyaev insists: the person is not in time, but time is in the person. It is always a *particular* person making a valiant step towards making deductions, following Kant's dictum — *sapere aude!*

Abbreviations

<i>Anast. Quaest.</i>	S. P. N. Anastasius Sinaita. Quaestiones et responsiones // PG. 89. Col. 327–824.
CCSG	Corpus Christianorum, Series Graeca
<i>Gregor. Capit.</i>	Gregorii Palamae. Capita physica, theologica, moralia et practica // PG. 150. Col. 1121–1225.
<i>In Ezech.</i>	Origenis in Ezechielem homiliae // PG. 13. Col. 663–767.
<i>Macar. Aeg. Hom.</i>	S. P. N. Macarii Aegyptii. Homiliae spirituales // PG. 34. Col. 449–821.
PG	Patrologia Graeca / Ed. J. P. Migne

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